Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minnici by Reinert, Alexander A. & Mulligan, Lumen N.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 5 
2013 
Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minnici 
Alexander A. Reinert 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
Lumen N. Mulligan 
University of Kansas School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alexander A. Reinert and Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minnici, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473 (2013). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1473 
ASKING THE FIRST QUESTION: 
REFRAMING BIVENS AFTER MINNECI 
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
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ABSTRACT 
In Minneci v. Pollard, decided in January 2012, the Supreme Court 
refused to recognize a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics suit against employees of a privately run federal 
prison because state tort law provided an alternative remedy, thereby 
adding a federalism twist to what had been strictly a separation-of-powers 
debate. In this Article, we show why this new state-law focus is misguided. 
We first trace the Court’s prior alternative-remedies-to-Bivens holdings, 
illustrating that this history is one narrowly focused on separation of 
powers at the federal level. Minneci’s break with this tradition raises 
several concerns. On a doctrinal level, the opinion destroys Bivens’s long-
established parallelism with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, where suits against 
privately employed individuals are allowed. Additionally, it creates 
asymmetries between the constitutional liability faced by privately and 
federally employed prison employees. More significantly, it conflicts with 
congressional intent as expressed in the Westfall Act, which codified the 
Bivens remedy in 1988, by conflating two distinct questions: whether a 
suit requires the courts to extend Bivens jurisprudence to a new context 
and whether, assuming an extension is necessary, such an extension is 
warranted. This piece offers the only full discussion to date of the 
importance of this “first question” to the Bivens canon. We end this 
Article by offering several strategies for limiting Minneci’s impact and for 
returning Bivens jurisprudence to its separation-of-powers roots.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Certainly, there is very little to be gained from the standpoint of 
federalism by preserving different rules of liability for federal 
officers dependent on the State where the injury occurs. 
—Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
1
 
As he faced the reality of a Supreme Court moving consistently to his 
right on civil liberties issues, Justice William Brennan, Jr. famously 
implored state courts to interpret their own constitutions to provide greater 
protection against governmental misconduct than his own Court was 
recognizing under the federal Constitution.
2
 ―New federalism‖ was born.3 
In Minneci v. Pollard,
4
 the United States Supreme Court turned new 
 
 
 1. 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 2. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495–98 (1977). 
 3. See generally James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 761, 771–78 (1992) (examining history of new federalism); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights 
and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (1999). 
 4. 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). 
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federalism on its head, relying on the availability of state law remedies to 
reject a federal constitutional remedy against employees of private 
contractors acting under color of federal law.
5
 Thus, rather than finding 
refuge in state law, claimants seeking to vindicate constitutional rights like 
those at issue in Minneci may find themselves stymied by it.  
On one view, Minneci is simply another in a long line of decisions
6
 
refusing to find a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics
7
 action available to recompense a violation of constitutional 
rights. In Minneci, a private prison operating under a contract with the 
federal government housed the plaintiff, Richard Pollard. Mr. Pollard 
alleged that employees of the prison, acting under color of federal law, 
denied him constitutionally adequate medical care after he fractured both 
of his elbows.
8
 Assuming he could prove these allegations, ―[w]ere Pollard 
incarcerated in a federal . . . facility, he would have a federal [Bivens] 
remedy [against the prison employees] for the Eighth Amendment 
violations he alleges.‖9 The Supreme Court, however, continuing its trend 
of rejecting the application of Bivens to ―new‖ contexts,10 found no federal 
remedy for Mr. Pollard.  
The result was not surprising. Since 1988, Bivens doctrine, which 
provides a cause of action for individuals harmed by the unconstitutional 
conduct of federal officials, has resided in a state of suspended animation. 
 
 
 5. See id. at 626 (―[W]here, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed 
personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the 
scope of traditional state tort law (such as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue here), 
the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law.‖). 
 6. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007) (holding Bivens relief inappropriate against 
federal officers for land-use disputes); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding 
Bivens relief inappropriate against a private corporate entity defendant); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 
(1994) (holding Bivens relief inappropriate against a federal agency defendant); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412 (1988) (holding Bivens relief in government-benefits disputes inappropriate given the 
existence of congressionally created alternative remedies); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 
(1987) (holding Bivens relief inappropriate when plaintiff‘s injury arises out of activity incident to 
military service); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding Bivens relief in government-
employment disputes inappropriate given the existence of congressionally created alternative 
remedies); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (holding Bivens relief inappropriate as between 
military personnel given the unique structure of the military). 
 7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal agents acting under color of federal law may be 
found liable for monetary damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment) [hereinafter Bivens]. 
Conventionally speaking, a Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See 
generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 16–22 (Anderson Pub. Co. 1995); 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 608–26 (5th ed., Aspen Pub. 2007). 
 8. Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 620–21. 
 9. Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 10. See supra note 6 (listing cases declining to extend the Bivens remedy). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Announced in 1971 to remedy Fourth Amendment violations, by 1980 the 
Court had announced only two additional decisions extending the Bivens 
remedy, for Equal Protection and Eighth Amendment violations.
11
 Since 
then, despite numerous opportunities, the Court has consistently refused to 
announce any additional Bivens remedies.
12
 During the same time period, 
however, Congress codified Bivens, at least as it existed in 1988, when it 
passed the Westfall Act.
13
 Thus, Bivens has been at a standstill—any 
further expansion limited by a hostile Court; any retraction barred by 
congressional action. 
If the result was to be expected, what was noteworthy in Minneci was 
the Court‘s embrace of state law as a per se bar to a Bivens suit, holding 
that because ―state tort law authorizes adequate alternative damages 
actions . . . we cannot do so.‖14 To appreciate the novelty of this reasoning, 
it is necessary to more precisely frame the issues at stake in Minneci. As 
we see it, resolving Minneci required answering two distinct questions. 
First, whether the plaintiff sought an extension of Carlson v. Green,
15
 a 
case in which the Court previously recognized a Bivens cause of action for 
violations of the Eighth Amendment by federally employed prison 
officials. And second, if he sought to extend Carlson, whether the Court 
should, on separation-of-powers grounds, imply a new Bivens remedy 
against private prison employees acting under color of federal law. In 
Minneci, the Court resolved this second question by turning to state law 
simpliciter, importing tort law to remedy constitutional violations without 
considering congressional intent. 
The significance of Minneci‘s federalism turn in answering this second 
question is more obvious when one considers the Bivens framework that 
the Court adopted in Wilkie v. Robbins only five short years ago. There the 
Court identified two steps in deciding whether to imply a new Bivens 
remedy (that is, after one has determined that a plaintiff‘s claim does not 
 
 
 11. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979) (Equal Protection). 
 12. See supra note 6. 
 13. See Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§ 2(a)(4), 2(b), 102 Stat. 4563, 4563–64 (1988) 
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2006)) (―Paragraph (1) [creating exclusive remedies for 
tort liability against federal officers] does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of 
the Government . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States‖); James 
E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 
GEO. L.J. 117, 122 (2009) (noting that Congress preserved the Bivens action in § 2679(b)(2)(A) and 
arguing that ―the Westfall Act supports . . . the routine availability of Bivens claims.‖); see also Carlos 
M. Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (2012). 
 14. Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 620. 
 15. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] REFRAMING BIVENS AFTER MINNECI 1477 
 
 
 
 
fit within a recognized Bivens remedy).
16
 First, the Court considers 
whether Congress or the Executive has chosen a remedial scheme as an 
alternative to a Bivens action.
17
 Although the Court has occasionally 
considered state-law remedies as an alternative to a Bivens action, it has 
done so as a separation-of-powers inquiry into congressional intent to 
deploy state law as the appropriate remedial scheme.
18
 Under Wilkie‘s 
second step—a step not reached in Minneci—the Court, acting as a 
common law tribunal, contemplates factors that counsel hesitation in 
crafting a remedy from a separation-of-powers vantage point.
19
  
 
 
 16. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
 17. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (declining to extend a Bivens 
remedy, in part, because the Bureau of Prisons already provided an administrative remedial scheme); 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424 (1988) (declining to extend a Bivens remedy for violations 
of constitutional rights within the Social Security system because Congress already put in place ―‗an 
unusually protective‘‖ remedial scheme); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1983) (similar). 
 18. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554 (looking to the availability of state-law claims as a factor 
counseling against finding a Bivens action to determine whether it could ―infer that Congress expected 
the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 19. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. While not the focus of this Article, it is worth noting that the Court‘s 
treatment of the Wilkie step-two inquiry also consistently focuses upon separation-of-powers, not 
federalism, concerns. The Court has considered four factors on the factors counseling hesitation 
inquiry—all of which are grounded in separation of powers. First, on separation-of-powers grounds, 
that Court has always considered claims against the federal treasury directly to be inappropriate in the 
Bivens context. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 396 (1971) (citing United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 315–16 (1947) (noting that if 
Congress had wished to take steps to create a cause of action to protect the federal fisc, it may so 
choose)); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (similar). Second, relying upon 
separation of powers, the Court holds that judicially crafted constitutional claims should not lie in 
areas uniquely within the competency of a separate branch of the federal government. See Bivens, 403 
U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 509–12 (1954) (not inferring an action 
because ―a complex of relations between federal agencies and their staffs [was] involved‖ to which 
Congress had not taken a position on the policy question before the Court)); see also Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300–01, 304 (1983) (similar); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–82 
(1987) (similar). Third, the Court also considers judicial manageability as a factor to consider when 
inferring a constitutional action. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391 n.4 (rejecting the concern raised by 
Justice Blackmun in dissent that the decision would create an avalanche of federal cases); id. at 411 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (―Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days. 
Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly 
express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. And 
current limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies 
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional 
principles.‖); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 
(1979) (noting that the courts‘ experience with Title VII sex-discrimination cases renders this Fifth 
Amendment claim standard fare); id. at 248 (rejecting docket-control concerns as a reason not to hear a 
Bivens claim in this context); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(discussing manageability matters); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 561–62 (similar); id. at 577 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (similar). Fourth, the final factor that arises in the Bivens-extension jurisprudence is the 
potential for deterrence of constitutional violations by persons acting under color of federal law. See 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (holding that the Court need not find that monetary damages is necessary to 
deterrence in order to infer a cause of action); id. at 407–08 (Harlan, J., concurring) (―In this regard I 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1478 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1473 
 
 
 
 
As Wilkie‘s synthesis of the Bivens caselaw makes apparent, the 
Minneci Court‘s eschewing of the traditional separation-of-powers 
framework in the alternative-remedies analysis lacks foundation in the 
Bivens canon. This full-throated embrace of state law in Bivens doctrine, 
in addition to being without precedent,
20
 is wrought with complications. 
First, it conflicts with the traditional parallelism of Bivens and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 actions, given that § 1983 law does not hinge the availability of 
constitutional remedies upon the defendant‘s employment status as either 
public or private.
21
 Second, Minneci runs counter to the presumption 
favoring symmetrical remedies for public and private employees for 
violations of constitutional rights.
22
 Our increasing reliance on private 
corporations to carry out the responsibilities of the federal government, 
moreover, gives these critiques increased salience.
23
 
Minneci also reveals the underappreciated significance of the ―first 
question‖ raised above: whether Mr. Pollard sought to extend prior Bivens 
 
 
agree with the Court that the appropriateness of according Bivens compensatory relief does not turn 
simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct.‖); id. at 413 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (―The deterrence theory underlying the suppression doctrine, or exclusionary rule, has a 
certain appeal in spite of the high price society pays for such a drastic remedy.‖); id. at 430 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (similar); see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21–23 (discussing the role of 
punitive damages in deterring conduct); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 (―If we were to imply a damages 
action directly against federal agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass qualified immunity, 
there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. 
Under Meyer‘s regime, the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.‖); Malesko, 534 U.S. 
at 70 (same). This factor also has a separation-of-powers component, as the deterrence question asks 
whether the judiciary‘s actions ―will tend to stultify proper law enforcement and to make the day‘s 
labor for the honest and conscientious officer even more onerous and more critical‖ or whether the 
judiciary—despite interference with executive action—has a duty to limit unconstitutional action. 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a useful discussion of the relationship between 
special factors analysis and separation of powers considerations, see generally Anya Bernstein, 
Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special About Special 
Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719 (2012). 
 20. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Cases Will Face New Hurdles, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2012, 
8:50 AM) http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/chemerinsky_new_hurdles_for_civil_rights_ 
cases/ (―for the first time, the court has said that the existence of state remedies can preclude a Bivens 
cause of action.‖). But see Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 13, at 571 (arguing that in some contexts it 
might be appropriate to limit Bivens based on the availability of state constitutional torts against 
federal officers). 
 21. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 22. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72. 
 23. See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military 
Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 897–99 (2004); Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 
CRIME & JUST. 265, 340–41 (2001) (concluding private prisons will continue to exist and grow in the 
United States and not replace public prisons, but compete with them and stimulate improvement of the 
total prison system); Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector 
Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2218 (1998) (―The number of inmates in 
private prisons is expected to grow thirty percent per year.‖); see also infra note 153 (citing additional 
sources). 
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doctrine at all such that it was necessary to infer a new remedy. In this 
Article, we provide a detailed analysis of this first question that the Court 
needed to answer in Minneci. If Mr. Pollard‘s claim could be encompassed 
by the Court‘s prior holding in Carlson, it should have proceeded without 
further analysis, just as other Bivens remedies have been applied to ―new‖ 
contexts without controversy.
24
 Moreover, Congress codified then-existing 
Bivens remedies in 1988 by passage of the Westfall Act. Thus, the ―first 
question‖ we explicate here is sound not only as a matter of stare decisis, 
but also as required on separation-of-powers grounds. 
The Minneci Court, however, elided this analytically prior question of 
when a plaintiff seeks to extend Bivens with the distinct question of when 
alternative remedies, be they state or federal, should prohibit such an 
extension. This conflation of concepts, we assert, runs contrary to the 
Court‘s prior analyses and Congress‘s codification of the Bivens remedy in 
the Westfall Act. Unfortunately, Minneci is not alone in neglecting to 
distinguish these two inquiries adequately; many commentators have made 
the same mistake, failing to recognize the importance of the predicate 
question of whether a plaintiff even seeks an extension of a recognized 
Bivens action.
25
 Our account, by contrast, is the first to coherently 
 
 
 24. The Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently assumed without analysis that the 
Bivens remedy applies to Fourth Amendment excessive force claims despite the fact that Bivens 
involved a challenge to a search and seizure without probable cause. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 
(2001), overruled on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989) (in dicta, assuming that Bivens applies to excessive force 
claims); Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2011) (reviewing Bivens claim for excessive 
force); Thomas v. Durastini, 607 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 
839 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting qualified immunity in Bivens excessive force claim); Ting v. United 
States, 927 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 
1987) (in dicta, treating excessive force claims as a ―classic Bivens-style tort‖); King v. United States, 
576 F.2d 432, 439 (2d Cir. 1978) (in dicta assuming that a Bivens action would lie for excessive force). 
The Court has made similar assumptions in Eighth Amendment cases, not limiting Carlson to the 
medical care context. See Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1851–52 (2010) (recognizing that an 
Eighth Amendment Bivens claim is generally available while holding that the instant case presented 
the separate question of official immunity); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994) 
(applying Bivens to failure to protect claim by prisoner); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 142 
(1992) (similar). The Court also has assumed the existence of a Bivens remedy to enforce the First 
Amendment. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (assuming the viability of a Bivens 
action for retaliation against individual in violation of the First Amendment); see also Walden v. Ctrs. 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.3 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming without 
deciding that Bivens applied to Free Exercise Clause claim); Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 
1149–50 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting qualified immunity motion to dismiss First Amendment Bivens 
claim for retaliatory arrest). 
 25. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1407, 1457–58 (2011) (treating extension solely as function of special factors and 
alternative remedies analysis); Morgan Leigh Manning, Less Than Picture Perfect: The Legal 
Relationship Between Photographers’ Rights and Law Enforcement, 78 TENN. L. REV. 105, 145 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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synthesize the Court‘s approach to both the predicate extension question 
and the more developed question of whether to imply a new Bivens 
remedy. Providing this structure further demonstrates the poverty of 
Minneci‘s analysis. 
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we address the Court‘s federalism 
turn in Minneci. We first discuss the treatment of alternative remedies in 
Bivens and its progeny as a matter of separation of powers for the forty 
years prior to Minneci. In so doing, we address the lack of new separation-
of-powers concerns raised in Minneci vis-à-vis prior Bivens decisions. We 
then outline the Court‘s federalism-centric reasoning in the case. We end 
the section with a discussion of the Court‘s odd intertwining of the 
extension question with the alternative-remedies issue. 
In Part II, we contend that this federalism turn in Bivens jurisprudence 
runs contrary to the status quo that Congress codified in the Westfall Act. 
Here we briefly review the Act. We then argue that the Court‘s confusion 
of the questions of whether an extension of Bivens is needed with the 
question of whether an extension is warranted runs contrary to 
congressional intent as expressed in the Westfall Act. Next, we contend 
that the Minneci opinion, undermining legislative intent, rejects the 
presumption of parallel doctrine with § 1983 cases and eschews the 
Malesko Court‘s symmetrical public-private liability principle.  
In Part III, we briefly consider several remedial options. We first 
discuss how state law might be used to ensure that constitutional norms 
are respected. Then we turn to doctrinal and theoretical matters that should 
be brought to bear in limiting Minneci, contending that the separation-of-
powers framework should be reinstated as the lodestar for application of 
Bivens doctrine. We conclude that, while Minneci is out of step with the 
Bivens canon, there remains some hope that this area of jurisprudence can 
be set back upon its separation-of-powers foundation. 
I. MINNECI AND THE FEDERALISM TURN 
In this part, we detail the evolution of the Court‘s alternative-remedies 
doctrine. We begin with the Bivens Court‘s original rejection of a state-
law-focused approach to constitutional remedies. We turn to the Court‘s 
 
 
(2010) (conflating extension analysis with special factors and alternative remedies analysis); Blake R. 
Bertagna, Reservations About Extending Bivens to Reservations: Seeking Monetary Relief Against 
Tribal Law Enforcement Officers for Constitutional Violations, 29 PACE L. REV. 585, 627–28 (2009) 
(ignoring predicate extension question); George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via 
Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 881–82 (2009) (focusing on confusion in 
special factors and alternative remedies analysis). 
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similar rejection of state-law simpliciter prior to Minneci. We end this 
section by describing the Court‘s federalism turn in which it both relies 
upon state law to provide alternative remedies to a Bivens action and elides 
the extension question with the alternative remedies question in one fell 
swoop. 
A. Separation of Powers Reasoning in Bivens 
Bivens itself highlights the controlling nature of separation-of-powers 
concerns in the decision to provide a damages cause of action for 
violations of the Constitution. In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a 
―violation of [the Fourth Amendment] by a federal agent acting under 
color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages 
consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct.‖26 Mr. Bivens alleged that 
federal agents, under color of federal law, illegally restrained him, 
searched his home, and arrested him.
27
 The lower courts dismissed Mr. 
Bivens‘s action, agreeing with the defendants‘ argument that Mr. Bivens‘s 
proper remedy lied in a state-law trespass claim.
28
 The Supreme Court 
reversed.
29
 
Central to the Court‘s decision was its conclusion that, even in the 
absence of implementing legislation, the Constitution provides a direct 
remedy in monetary damages for a violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights.
30
 The Court acknowledged that it lacked a statutory basis for 
providing this remedy and that ―the Fourth Amendment does not in so 
many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages 
for the consequences of its violation.‖31 The Court, nevertheless, held that 
it could infer such a cause of action directly from the Constitution when 
three conditions were met. First, analogizing from its cases involving 
implied rights of action under statutes, the Court assumed that the 
Constitution could imply actions as well.
32
 Second, and more directly 
 
 
 26. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
 27. Id. (―The agents manacled petitioner in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest 
the entire family. They searched the apartment from stem to stern. Thereafter, petitioner was taken to 
the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip 
search.‖). 
 28. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718 (2d 
Cir. 1969); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12 
(E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 29. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. 
 30. Id. at 395. 
 31. Id. at 396. 
 32. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). What the Court means by ―general 
right to sue‖ in this context is far from clear. Section 1983 is limited to actions against state officials. 
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rooted in separation-of-powers analysis, the Bivens Court held that it is 
appropriate to infer a constitutional remedy when there are no special 
factors counseling hesitation.
33
 Third, and our immediate focus, the Court 
held that the inference is appropriate when Congress had not foreclosed 
awarding money damages for constitutional violations caused by federal 
agents.
34
 In so holding, the Bivens Court cited to Wheeldin v. Wheeler
35
 
and its reasoning based on separation-of-powers concerns that the Court 
should not find a constitutional cause of action in an area where Congress 
already had contemplated remedial schemes.
36
 Finding no similar 
congressional scheme to remedy the Fourth Amendment injuries to Mr. 
Bivens, the Court found the cause of action implied by the Constitution. 
The dissent and concurrence saw the alternative-remedies issue in 
Bivens to be primarily one of separation of powers as well. The dissenters 
concluded that separation-of-powers concerns were the central issue, 
arguing that the creation of federal remedies was essentially a legislative 
act that fell within the exclusive power of Congress.
37
 Justice Harlan‘s 
concurrence also identified the principal question to be ―whether the 
power to authorize damages as a judicial remedy for the vindication of a 
federal constitutional right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively 
in Congress‘ hands.‖38  
Federalism concerns, on the other hand, did not control the Bivens 
Court‘s holding. The Court rejected the notion that the protections 
afforded under the Fourth Amendment are strictly co-extensive to those 
found under state law.
39
 Indeed, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment is an independent check upon federal power consistently 
applied throughout the country, which ―is not tied to the niceties of local 
 
 
See, e.g., Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (holding federal agents are not liable under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983). Thus, at the time Bivens was decided there was not a general right to sue federal 
agents for constitutional violations, merely a general right to sue state agents. 
 33. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. For a discussion of special factors analysis, see supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
 34. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97. 
 35. 373 U.S. 647 (1963). 
 36. See id. at 652 (―We conclude, therefore, that it is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has 
left in this area.‖). 
 37. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (―Legislation is the business of the 
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task—as we do not.‖); id. at 427–28 (Black, 
J., dissenting) (the majority‘s holding is ―an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give 
us.‖); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (if adequate remedies do not exist for Fourth Amendment 
violations, ―it is the Congress and not this Court that should act.‖). 
 38. Id. at 401–02 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 392–94 (majority opinion). 
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trespass laws.‖40 Moreover, the Court held that the interests protected 
under state-law trespass and invasion of privacy doctrines may be 
inconsistent or even hostile to those interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.
41
 For example, the Court noted that to bring a state-law 
trespass claim the plaintiff must show that he did not allow the defendant 
into the home.
42
 But the Court reasoned that an officer who demands 
admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different 
position from the typical trespasser.
43
 As a result, the Court concluded 
that, in most cases, a mere invocation of authority by a federal official will 
cause the average citizen to allow the official access to the home, 
rendering trespass doctrine an ineffective remedy against abuses of federal 
power.
44
 
In concurrence, Justice Harlan also specifically rejected a federalism 
approach to the alternative-remedies question, observing that ―there is very 
little to be gained from the standpoint of federalism by preserving different 
rules of liability for federal officers dependent on the State where the 
injury occurs.‖45 Justice Harlan proceeded to reason that 
[p]utting aside the desirability of leaving the problem of federal 
official liability to the vagaries of common-law actions, it is 
apparent that some form of damages is the only possible remedy for 
someone in Bivens‘ alleged position. . . . For people in Bivens‘ 
shoes, it is damages or nothing.
46
  
Ironically, this last sentence, which is the culmination of a two-paragraph 
argument against the advisability of a state-law approach to constitutional 
damages enforcement, is regularly cited by those who have argued for 
Bivens remedies to be rejected based on the availability of state-law 
remedies.
47
 
The Bivens Court‘s focus on separation of powers in the alternative-
remedies discussion makes clear that the availability of state-law remedies 
had been irrelevant to whether a Bivens remedy should lie. In Bivens, the 
Court‘s focus was on the distinction between private citizens and an 
 
 
 40. Id. at 393–94. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 409–10. 
 47. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001) (quoting Justice Harlan‘s 
Bivens concurrence as an authority to rely upon state law to remedy constitutional violations); see also 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007) (quoting Passman‘s quotation of Justice Harlan). 
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―agent‖ acting ―in the name of the United States‖; the right to be free of 
unconstitutional conduct ―carried out by virtue of federal authority‖; and 
the invasion of ―federally protected rights‖48—not on ―the niceties of local 
trespass laws [i.e., state tort law].‖49  
B. Alternative Remedies After Bivens and Separation of Powers 
Following the Bivens separation-of-powers-based opinion, the Court 
has consistently looked to the existence of federally approved or created 
remedies as a reason to prohibit a Bivens action on alternative-remedies 
grounds. Davis v. Passman,
50
 for example, followed this separation-of-
powers focus in its alternative-remedies discussion. Here, a former 
congressional staffer sued her past employer, a retired member of the 
House, alleging that she was terminated because of her sex in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.
51
 The Court‘s discussion of alternative remedies did 
not focus solely on remedies created by Congress, but separation-of-
powers analysis drove the inquiry. Thus, although the Court noted that Ms. 
Davis lacked relief at both state and federal law, it first quoted Justice 
Harlan‘s Bivens concurrence, which itself rejected a federalism approach 
to the Bivens-extension analysis in favor of a separation-of-powers 
approach.
52
 The relevance of any state-law relief was questionable given 
the Court‘s observation that the case involved violation of federal law by a 
federal actor, creating the presumption that federal court was the 
appropriate site of any remedy.
53
 Moreover, the Court noted that Congress 
had not specifically prohibited the award of damages in suits such as 
Passman.
54
 The dissenting opinions also viewed this case as primarily a 
separation-of-powers question.
55
 
 
 
 48. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391–92. 
 49. Id. at 393–94. 
 50. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 51. Id. at 231. 
 52. Id. at 245. 
 53. Id. at 245 n.23 (―Deference to state-court adjudication in a case such as this would in any 
event not serve the purposes of federalism, since it involves the application of the Fifth Amendment to 
a federal officer in the course of his federal duties. It is therefore particularly appropriate that a federal 
court be the forum in which a damages remedy be awarded.‖). 
 54. Id. at 247. 
 55. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (―I dissent because, for me, the case presents very grave 
questions of separation of powers, rather than Speech or Debate Clause issues, although the two have 
certain common roots.‖); id. at 251 (Powell, J., dissenting) (―I write separately to emphasize that no 
prior decision of this Court justifies today‘s intrusion upon the legitimate powers of Members of 
Congress.‖). Justice Stewart dissented as well, but on procedural grounds that the Speech or Debate 
Clause issue should have first been ruled on by the lower courts. Id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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Carlson v. Green
56
 took a separation-of-powers approach to the 
alternative-remedies question as well. In Carlson, the estate of a federal 
prisoner brought, among other things, Bivens claims for alleged Eighth 
Amendment violations after prison officials failed to give him proper 
medical attention.
57
 The Court found that two factors could bar a Bivens 
claim in this situation: special factors counseling hesitation or alternative 
remedies.
58
 In addressing the question of alternative remedies, the Court 
held that a Bivens action would not lie if ―Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective.‖59 Thus, the Court looked to prior congressional action in its 
Bivens-extension analysis and found that Congress specifically 
contemplated that Bivens suits would be an available remedy in cases such 
as Carlson.
60
 Moreover, this separation-of-powers stance was taken in the 
face of a remedy, the scope of which was defined by state law. In addition 
to a Bivens claim, the plaintiff in Carlson had a claim under the Federal 
Torts Claim Act,
61
 which creates vicarious liability in the federal 
government for state-law torts committed by federal employees.
62
 The 
Court held, however, that Congress, absent an explicit statement to the 
contrary, would not want state law, as incorporated by the FTCA, to 
displace Bivens liability because it would not provide an adequate 
safeguard against constitutional injuries.
63
 Moreover the concurring
64
 and 
 
 
 56. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 57. Id. at 16 n.1. 
 58. Id. at 18. 
 59. Id. at 18–19 (first emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 19–20 (―[T]he congressional comments accompanying that amendment made it crystal 
clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action . . . .‖). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (United States liable ―in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act or omission occurred . . . .‖); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–17, 17 n.2, 23 (1980). 
 63. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23 (―The question whether respondent‘s action for violations by federal 
officials of federal constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States 
admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.‖). 
 64. See id. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring) (―Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be 
unnecessary when Congress has provided ‗equally effective‘ alternative remedies.‖); id. at 27 (―The 
Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress possesses the power to enact adequate alternative 
remedies that would be exclusive. . . . Such a drastic curtailment of discretion would be inconsistent 
with the Court‘s long-standing recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create 
federal remedies.‖); id. at 29 (―In my view, the Court‘s willingness to infer federal causes of action 
that cannot be found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers 
and hardly comports with a rational system of justice.‖); id. at 29–30 (allowing the possible operation 
of state-law liability rules, not of their own force as state-law causes of action, but only as incorporated 
as a rule of decision under a federal common law cause of action). 
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dissenting
65
 opinions also focused upon the separation-of-powers 
aspects—not federalism aspects—of the alternative-remedies issue. 
Even in the multitude of cases since Carlson in which the Court has 
declined to adopt new Bivens remedies, the Court has predominantly 
approached the question of alternative remedies from a separation-of-
powers perspective. In Bush v. Lucas,
66
 the Court declined to recognize a 
Bivens claim alleging First Amendment violations brought by government 
civil service employees against superiors.
67
 Determining that its 
application of Bivens depended on ―relevant policy determinations made 
by the Congress,‖68 it found that the plaintiff had access to congressionally 
created alternative ―comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions 
giving meaningful remedies against the United States.‖69 Indeed, the Bush 
Court showed greater deference to congressional action by requiring only 
that congressionally created remedies be ―meaningful,‖70 moving away 
 
 
 65. See id. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―The creation of such remedies is a task that is more 
appropriately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere of authority.‖); id. at 35 (―the Court 
appears to be fashioning for itself a legislative role resembling that once thought to be the domain of 
Congress . . . .‖); id. at 36 (―Because the judgments that must be made here involve many ‗competing 
policies, goals, and priorities‘ that are not well suited for evaluation by the Judicial Branch, in my view 
‗[t]he task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a 
matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States.‘‖ (alterations in original)); id. at 37 (―Just as 
there are some tasks that Congress may not impose on an Art. III court, there are others that an Art. III 
court may not simply seize for itself without congressional authorization. This concern is initially 
reflected in the notion that federal courts do not have the authority to act as general courts of common 
law absent congressional authorization.‖ (internal citations omitted)); id. at 41 (―In my view, absent a 
clear indication from Congress, federal courts lack the authority to grant damages relief for 
constitutional violations. Although Congress surely may direct federal courts to grant relief in Bivens-
type actions, it is enough that it has not done so.‖); id. at 48–50 (rejecting a norm of uniform federal 
rules of decisions for federal officer liability, but doing so in a manner suggested in Justice Powell‘s 
concurring opinion—namely, doing so under the guise of a federal common law incorporating a state-
law rule of decision). Chief Justice Burger‘s short dissent, however, could be construed, in part, as 
favoring a federalism approach, but this is far from transparent. See id. at 31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(―Until today, I had thought that Bivens was limited to those circumstances in which a civil rights 
plaintiff had no other effective remedy.‖). 
 66. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 67. Id. at 368. 
 68. Id. at 373. 
 69. Id. at 368; see also id. at 390 (Marshall, J., concurring) (―I write separately only to emphasize 
that in my view a different case would be presented if Congress had not created a comprehensive 
scheme that was specifically designed to provide full compensation to civil service employees who are 
discharged or disciplined in violation of their First Amendment rights.‖). 
 70. Id. at 386. See also David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an 
Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens 
Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683, 694 (1985) (contending that after Davis and Carlson the Court abandoned 
the ―Equally Effective‖ Approach). 
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from the requirement that alternative remedies be ―viewed as equally 
effective‖ to a Bivens claim.71 
Following this same track, the Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky
72
 held 
that no Bivens remedy exists for Equal Protection Clause claims filed by 
disabled social security beneficiaries who lacked administrative monetary 
relief for emotional distress due to delays in receiving their social security 
benefits.
73
 As in Bush, the Court relied upon Congress‘s creation of 
alternative, although not equivalent, administrative relief to prohibit the 
Bivens claim.
74
 Forming a general principle, again one focused on 
separation-of-powers, the Court held that ―[w]hen the design of a 
Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it 
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that 
may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created 
additional Bivens remedies.‖75  
The next Supreme Court case to consider alternative remedies as a 
ground not to find a Bivens claim available came in Correctional Services 
Corp. v. Malesko,
76
 a decision that, under some readings, changed the 
nature of the Bivens action dramatically.
77
 Mr. Malesko, a federal prisoner 
living in a privately run halfway house, had a heart condition that entitled 
him to use the elevator to access his fifth floor room despite the general 
policy requiring inmates to use the stairs.
78
 Nevertheless, an employee of 
the halfway house required Mr. Malesko to climb the stairs, which resulted 
 
 
 71. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979). 
 72. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 73. Id. at 424–25. 
 74. Id. at 429 (―Congress . . . has addressed the problems created by state agencies‘ wrongful 
termination of disability benefits‖ through the creation of administrative remedies). 
 75. Id. at 423. 
 76. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 77. See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won’t Die: The Legacy of Peoples v. CCA 
Detention Centers, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 685 (2006) (arguing that the death of the Bivens action will 
merely recast federal constitutional issues as hybrid claims with federal questions arising on certiorari 
under the government-contractor defense and under § 1331 jurisdiction under Grable and Sons); 
Matthew G. Mazefsky, Note, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko: Unmasking the Implied Damage 
Remedy, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 639 (2003) (concluding that Malesko marks the final throes of the cause 
of action implied directly under the Constitution); Andrea Robeda, Note, The Death of Implied Causes 
of Action: The Supreme Court’s Recent Bivens Jurisprudence and the Effect on State Constitutional 
Tort Jurisprudence: Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 33 N.M. L. REV. 401 (2003) (same); 
Mariana Claridad Pastore, Note, Running from the Law: Federal Contractors Escape Bivens Liability, 
4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2002) (same). But see Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Section 
1983 Litigation: Supreme Court Review, A Round Table Dialogue, 19 TOURO L. REV. 625, 678 (2003) 
(―[A]lthough the Court is continuing to narrow Bivens, it is not overruling or signaling an overruling of 
Bivens. The core of Bivens is that if a federal officer violates a constitutional right, there is generally a 
remedy available. That has not been overturned.‖) (Chemerinsky speaking). 
 78. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64. 
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in a heart attack.
79
 Mr. Malesko then brought a Bivens suit alleging Eighth 
Amendment violations against the halfway house, a private corporation 
under contract with the United States Bureau of Prisons.
80
 
The Court held that such a suit could not be brought against corporate, 
federal contractors who operate prisons,
81
 providing three rationales for its 
decision. First, the Court held that the purpose of a Bivens action is to 
deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional 
violations—not governmental agencies or corporate entities.82 Following 
this principle, publicly held prisoners may not seek a Bivens claim against 
the Bureau of Prisons, and similarly, privately held prisoners may not seek 
a Bivens claim against the corporation running the prison.
83
 While this no-
entity-liability principle was seemingly sufficient to decide the case, the 
Court proceeded—in what reads as dicta84—to provide two more 
rationales for its decision.  
The second factor provided by the Malesko Court was the need to 
maintain parity between the remedies afforded prisoners at privately 
operated facilities and those at government-operated facilities.
85
 Relying 
on familiar themes, the Court held that the judicial creation of 
asymmetrical remedies between government contractors and government 
employees would violate separation-of-powers principles.
86
 The Court 
reasoned, ―[w]hether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability costs 
on private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to 
decide.‖87 Thus, the Court rejected Mr. Malesko‘s Bivens claim against the 
private prison because federal prisoners incarcerated in federally run 
facilities do not have plaintiff‘s contemplated entity-liability remedy 
against the Bureau of Prisons.
88
  
Finally, the Court stated that the existence of alternative remedies 
precluded a Bivens claim.
89
 The Court pointed to two alternative remedies 
available to Mr. Malesko. The Court first stated, unexceptionally given its 
 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 63. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 71. 
 83. Id. at 72. 
 84. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 13, at 147–48 (describing the Malesko discussion of 
alternative state remedies as dicta). 
 85. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–72.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 72. 
 88. Id. at 72–74. 
 89. Id. at 72 (finding that Mr. Malesko was not ―confronted with a situation in which claimants 
in [his] shoes lack effective remedies.‖). 
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prior separation-of-powers-based case law from Bivens to Schweiker, that 
the possibility of administrative relief within the Bureau of Prisons 
precluded a Bivens claim.
90
 However, in a move that is quite exceptional 
given its rulings in Bivens and Carlson rejecting the notion that state torts 
sufficiently protect constitutional interests, the Court also stated that Mr. 
Malesko‘s claim was quintessentially one for negligence and, thus, a state-
law tort claim was available to remedy his constitutional claim.
91
  
The Court‘s over-determination of its holding in Malesko has only 
fostered confusion. Even assuming each Malesko factor (i.e., the no-entity-
liability principle, the symmetry principle, and the alternative-relief 
principle) is sufficient standing alone to bar a Bivens claim,
92
 the Malesko 
decision raises the further question of whether the existence of alternative 
federal remedies, alternative state-law remedies, or both working in 
conjunction barred Mr. Malesko‘s Bivens claim.93 If Malesko, properly 
understood, endorses the view that the existence of a state-law remedy 
standing alone precludes a Bivens action against a private defendant, then 
the Malesko Court radically departed from its past separation-of-power, 
Bivens-extension jurisprudence.
94
 Indeed, both parties to the Malesko case, 
 
 
 90. Id. at 74; see also 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2012); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) 
(holding that the existence of alternative federal remedies is sufficient, standing alone, to bar a Bivens 
suit); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (same).  
 91. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73 (―[R]espondent‘s complaint . . . arguably alleged nothing 
more than a quintessential claim of negligence‖), with Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (―the 
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens‘ constitutional rights should be governed by 
uniform rules.‖) and Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 393–94 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment ―is not 
tied to the niceties of local trespass laws.‖). 
 92. There are good reasons to make this assumption. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) 
(holding that the no-entity-liability principle, standing alone, is sufficient to bar a Bivens action as 
against a government agency); Schweiker, 487 U.S. 412 (holding that the existence of alternative 
federal remedies is sufficient, standing alone, to bar a Bivens suit); Bush, 462 U.S. 367 (same); 
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–72 (discussing the symmetry principle as a reason to extend liability to 
private parties acting color of state law in the § 1983 context).  
 93. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70–72 (presenting both sets of alternative remedies as grounds for 
barring a Bivens claim); see also John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 723, 729–30 (2008) (noting that Malesko is not clear on whether state law standing 
alone, or in conjunction with B.O.P. remedies, presented effective alternative grounds for relief). 
 94. See supra notes 30–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Court‘s pre-Malesko, 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence); see also Preis, supra note 93, at 725 (noting Malesko as a sea 
change for the use of state-law remedies). But see Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 13 (arguing that in 
some contexts it might be appropriate to limit Bivens based on the availability of state constitutional 
torts against federal officers). Indeed, prior to Malesko, the Courts of Appeals regularly heard Bivens 
claims against private defendants acting under color of federal law without a determination that 
plaintiff lacked a state-law alternative remedy. See, e.g., Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard 
Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Bivens claim may be brought against a 
private actor if the defendant was acting under color of federal law); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics 
Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1337–38 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1057 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); 
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and the United States as amicus, assumed that a Bivens action would lie 
against employees of privately run prisons, regardless of the existence of 
state-law remedies
95—strongly suggesting that they viewed the no-entity-
liability and symmetry principles as controlling.  
The Court offered clarification on the use of alternative state-law 
remedies in Wilkie v. Robbins, which brought the ambiguous alternative 
state-law remedies language of Malesko back into conformity with the 
Court‘s separation-of-powers tradition.96 In Wilkie, government officials 
inadvertently let an easement on Mr. Robbins‘ property expire.97 After Mr. 
Robbins refused to renew the easement without compensation, the 
officials engaged in a multi-year project of harassment of Mr. Robbins and 
his business ventures.
98
 Mr. Robbins brought a retaliation theory of 
recovery against the government agents using a Bivens cause of action as 
the vehicle.
99
  
Although the Court in Wilkie refused to find a Bivens action on 
judicial-manageability grounds,
100
 a step-two concern, the case clarified 
 
 
Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 307 (D. Mass. 1999) (same). The First Circuit, 
pre-Malesko, appears to have assumed that such an action was appropriate. See Gerena v. Puerto Rico 
Legal Servs., Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir. 1983). Prior to Malesko, three courts of appeals had 
declined to answer whether a plaintiff may assert a Bivens claim against a private actor. See DeVargas 
v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988); Morast v. Lance, 807 
F.2d 926, 930–31 (11th Cir. 1987); McNally v. Pulitzer Publ‘g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75–76 (8th Cir. 
1976). Notably, prior to Malesko, only the First Circuit, in dicta, had stated that ―[w]hile federal 
officers may, at times, be subject to suit for unconstitutional behavior, there is no cause of action 
against private parties acting under color of federal law or custom.‖ Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. 
Trust Nat‘l Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 932 n.8 (1st Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). As is illustrated above, 
however, the First Circuit appeared to have rejected this dicta by 1983. See Gerena, 697 F.2d at 449. 
In any event, no circuit predicated the existence of a Bivens claim upon the absence of a state-law 
remedy. After Malesko, however, the lower courts split on this issue. See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 621 
(noting the circuit split). The district courts also split on the issue, with some finding that a Bivens 
action remained against private persons acting under color of federal law. See, e.g., Sanusi v. INS, 100 
Fed. Appx. 49, 52 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding the question); Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. 
Supp. 2d 52 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that existence of a state-law remedy standing alone does not 
foreclose a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor running a private prison); Jama v. 
INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 362–63 (D.N.J. 2004) (adopting Sarro). Others did not. See Preis, supra 
note 93, at 731 n.37 (listing cases). 
 95. See Br. of Pet‘r, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860) 2001 WL 
53566 at *13; Br. of Resp., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 
993679 at *8, *12; Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Corr. Servs. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 558228 at *11–*12. This question was 
specifically reserved by the Court. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 65 (―[T]he parties agree that the question 
whether a Bivens action might lie against a private individual is not presented here.‖). 
 96. 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 97. Id. at 542. 
 98. Id. at 543–46. 
 99. Id. at 547–48 (pressing violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
 100. Id. at 562 (perceiving the issue to be ―endlessly knotty to work out‖ and that finding a claim 
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the role of alternative state-law remedies in the step-one analysis. The 
Wilkie Court considered whether Mr. Robbins had adequate alternative 
state remedies, ultimately finding he did not. Although the Court cited by 
analogy to Malesko for looking to state law,
101
 its reference must be read 
against the Wilkie Court‘s later discussion that state-law remedies will bar 
a Bivens claim only if the Court concludes that Congress intended to rely 
upon state-law remedies as an alternative remedy. The Court devoted a 
paragraph to this topic: 
 This state of the law gives Robbins no intuitively meritorious 
case for recognizing a new constitutional cause of action, but 
neither does it plainly answer no to the question whether he should 
have it. Like the combination of public and private land ownership 
around the ranch, the forums of defense and redress open to 
Robbins are a patchwork, an assemblage of state and federal, 
administrative and judicial benches applying regulations, statutes, 
and common law rules. It would be hard to infer that Congress 
expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand, but equally hard to 
extract any clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new claim. 
Compare Bush, 462 U.S., at 388 (refusing to create a Bivens remedy 
when faced with ―an elaborate remedial system that has been 
constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy 
considerations‖); and Schweiker, 487 U.S., at 426 (―Congress chose 
specific forms and levels of protection for the rights of persons 
affected‖), with Bivens, 403 U.S., at 397 (finding ―no explicit 
congressional declaration that persons injured [in this way] may not 
recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be 
remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of 
Congress‖).102  
As this passage makes clear, the Court considered alternative state-law 
remedies only to determine whether it could ―infer that Congress expected 
the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand.‖103 Moreover, the Wilkie opinion‘s 
citations to Bush, Schweiker, and Bivens—all of which focus on the 
separation-of-powers question of whether Congress chose an alternative to 
Bivens and tellingly not to Malesko‘s federalism language—further 
 
 
here ―would invite an onslaught of Bivens actions,‖); see also id. at 554 (explaining that Wilkie is ―a 
case for Bivens step two‖ (special factors analysis), not step one (alternative remedies analysis)). 
 101. Id. at 551. 
 102. Id. at 554. 
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
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cements the conclusion that the quest for alternative state-law remedies in 
Wilkie was done within the context of divining congressional intent.
104
 
That is to say, the alternative state-law remedies discussion in Wilkie was 
not a blanket rule that the presence of state-law relief bars a Bivens suit in 
every case. Rather, the Wilkie analysis fixed the alternative-state-law-
remedies question as a part of the Court‘s traditional separation-of-powers 
inquiry into congressional intent—as found in Bivens,105 Carlson,106 
Bush,
107
 Schweiker
108
 and (in part in) Malesko
109—to deploy a remedial 
scheme as an alternative to a constitutional action as a reason stay its 
Bivens hand. 
C. State-Law Alternative Remedies in Minneci 
With this background in mind, we can turn our attention more directly 
to Minneci. In rendering its opinion, the Minneci Court did not look, 
contrary to this past practice, to congressional approval of alternative 
remedies as a basis to refuse Bivens relief. This failure to point to 
congressional action flows, at least in part, from the fact that Congress has 
not chosen to exercise an alternative scheme to remedy Eighth 
Amendment violations that occur in privately run prisons by persons 
acting under color of federal law. Unlike Malesko, Schweiker, and Bush, 
the plaintiff in Minneci did not have access to any congressionally or 
administratively created alternative remedies. Also, unlike Wilkie, the 
Court found no evidence to suggest that Congress desired the courts to 
employ state-law remedies as an alternative to a Bivens claim against 
employees of federal contractors acting under color of federal law. Thus in 
accord with the assumption of all the parties involved in the last private-
actor Bivens case before the Court,
110
 given that no evidence supported the 
finding that Congress or the Executive intended for victims of 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (finding no congressionally created alternative to a constitutional action). 
 106. 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (―the congressional comments accompanying that amendment 
made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of 
action‖). 
 107. 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (finding a congressionally created alternative to a constitutional 
action). 
 108. 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (finding a congressionally created alternative to a constitutional 
action). 
 109. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (noting the existence of alternative 
administrative relief). 
 110. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting that in Malesko, the plaintiff, the private 
prison and the United States all assumed that a Bivens action would lie against employees of a private 
prison when they acted under color of federal law). 
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constitutional violations committed by employees of federal government 
contracts acting under color of federal law to deploy an alternative 
remedial scheme, a Bivens claim should have been available under prior 
law. Nevertheless, the Minneci Court looked to the existence of state-law 
remedies simpliciter as the basis to reject a Bivens suit. 
The Court‘s justification for this federalism turn in alternative remedies 
was terse, offering only two brief bursts of support for its new view. First, 
the Court summarized in one sentence its federalism-based view in the 
introduction to the opinion. Citing Wilkie, but failing to note that Wilkie 
looked to state law only within the context of divining congressional 
intent, the Court stated that ―[b]ecause we believe that . . . state tort law 
authorizes adequate alternative damages actions . . . we cannot [provide a 
Bivens remedy].‖111  
The Court‘s primary argument was not much longer. After the Court 
reviewed the facts, procedural posture of the case and its Bivens case law, 
the Court offered a one-paragraph defense of the turn to federalism. Here, 
the Court again cited to Wilkie and held, in full: 
[W]e conclude that Pollard cannot assert a Bivens claim.  
 That is primarily because Pollard‘s Eighth Amendment claim 
focuses upon a kind of conduct that typically falls within the scope 
of traditional state tort law. And in the case of a privately employed 
defendant, state tort law provides an ―alternative, existing process‖ 
capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake. The 
existence of that alternative here constitutes a ―convincing reason 
for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and 
freestanding remedy in damages.‖112 
In the final section of the opinion, the Court proceeded to rebut 
counter-arguments related to the adequacy of state-law remedies to protect 
constitutional interests—not the separation-of-powers question of whether 
Congress desired to deploy state law in this manner.
113
 Nevertheless, the 
Court briefly considered in this section whether a uniform, federal 
alternative to Bivens is required.
114
 Citing to dicta from Malesko that 
looked to state-law actions—without noting Wilkie‘s rehabilitation of this 
use of state law as part of the traditional congressional intent analysis—the 
 
 
 111. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012). 
 112. Id. at 623 (internal citations to Wilkie omitted). 
 113. Id. at 623–26. 
 114. Id. at 624. 
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Court quickly reasserted that state law alternative remedies are 
sufficient.
115
 
Finally, the Court considered the argument that Mr. Pollard‘s case did 
not present an extension of Bivens at all, but rather was an application of 
existing doctrine under the Carlson decision, which held that federally 
employed prison guard are amenable to Bivens suits to remedy Eighth 
Amendment violations.
116
 The Court dismissed this concern. Here it 
argued that the ―existence of an adequate ‗alternative, existing process‘ 
differs dramatically in the two sets of cases. Prisoners ordinarily cannot 
bring state-law tort actions against employees of the Federal Government. 
But [privately housed] prisoners ordinarily can bring state-law tort actions 
against employees of a private firm.‖117 Again citing dicta from Malesko 
that looked to state-law actions—and again without noting Wilkie‘s 
treatment of the same—the Court equated the extension question as co-
extensive with ―the existence of alternative ‗effective‘ state tort 
remedies.‖118 And with that, the Court turned its back on forty years of 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence under the Bivens doctrine.  
II. PROBLEMS WITH RELIANCE ON STATE LAW IN THE BIVENS CANON 
The Minneci Court‘s federalism turn incurs many costs, some of which 
have been previously noted. For instance, this practice gives the states a 
reverse preemption power contrary to the dictates of the Supremacy 
Clause.
119
 Moreover, commentators have noted that state tort law, having 
developed to regulate the interactions of private individuals, cannot well 
absorb the unique problems posed by the governmental character of 
constitutional torts.
120
 In this section we outline two additional reasons 
why the Court‘s turn to federalism is misguided from a congressional-
intent perspective. First, eliding the extension question with a federalism-
based approach to alternative remedies radically reduces the scope of 
Bivens relief which Congress attempted to codify in the Westfall Act. 
Second, the practical impact of Minneci may be to permit a Bivens cause 
 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 623. 
 117. Id. (citations omitted). 
 118. Id. at 624. 
 119. Indeed, the very purpose intended by the Supremacy Clause was to avoid the ―disparities, 
confusions and conflicts‖ that would follow if the federal government‘s general authority were subject 
to local controls. U.S. v. Allegheny Cnty., 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).  
 120. See Preis, supra note 93, at 750–56. But see Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 13 (arguing that 
in some contexts it might be appropriate to limit Bivens based on the availability of state constitutional 
torts against federal officers). 
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of action to be contracted away by federal entities that outsource their 
responsibilities to private corporations. This will create even greater 
asymmetries than already exist between Bivens and the § 1983 cause of 
action and between the remedies available against private and public 
defendants. 
A. Minneci and the Predicate “Extension” Question 
Minneci neglected to provide a framework for addressing the predicate 
question of whether a litigant is even seeking an extension of an existing 
Bivens cause of action. In Minneci, this was critical because the Court 
already had held that the Eighth Amendment may be enforced directly 
against federal employees of the Bureau of Prisons.
121
 Only if Mr. 
Minneci‘s cause of action—brought under the Eighth Amendment against 
employees of contractors with the federal government—were considered 
an extension of Carlson would it be necessary to proceed with Wilkie‘s 
step-one and step-two analysis. The Court implicitly acknowledges this, 
but in rejecting the argument that Carlson applied directly in Minneci, it 
rested entirely on the existence of alternative state-law remedies.
122
 In 
other words, to decide whether it needed to proceed to Wilkie‘s step-one 
analysis, the Court simply applied Wilkie‘s step-one analysis. The 
conflation of the predicate-extension question with Wilkie step-one is 
misguided because it ignores important separation-of-powers concerns that 
arise from congressional approval of the Bivens action in the Westfall 
Act.
123
  
1. The Westfall Act and the Codification of Bivens 
Despite the Court‘s rhetoric that Bivens represents the Court acting 
entirely on its own accord, Congress has ratified the Bivens remedy twice. 
First, in the 1974 amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 
which provides a direct remedy against the United States for common law 
torts committed by federal employees, legislative history supported the 
notion that Congress viewed Bivens as a complementary remedy to the 
FTCA‘s.124 Indeed, the Court itself recognized that these amendments 
 
 
 121. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 122. See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 623–24. 
 123. For a detailed argument along these lines, see Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 13, at 132–
38. 
 124. See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791 (―[T]his 
provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives 
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―made it crystal clear‖ that Congress intended for Bivens actions to be 
available as a general matter.
125
 
Second, and our focus here, Congress, in 1988, textually adopted 
Bivens in the Westfall Act, another amendment to the FTCA. Under the 
Westfall Act, federal employees are rendered immune from state-law tort 
claims.
126
 The Act mandates that if a state-law tort claim is brought against 
federal employees and they are certified to have been acting within the 
scope of their official duties by the Attorney General, then the United 
States must be substituted for the employee as the defendant.
127
 The Act 
further states that this remedy against the United States under the FTCA 
constitutes the exclusive remedy for such tort plaintiffs.
128
 The Westfall 
Act, nevertheless, explicitly embraces Bivens actions, stating that the 
exclusive remedy provision ―does not extend or apply to a civil action 
against an employee of the Government which is brought for a violation of 
the Constitution of the United States.‖129  
The Westfall Act significantly affects the Bivens jurisprudential 
landscape. As Pfander and Baltmanis have argued, ―Congress, in enacting 
the Westfall Act, should be understood to have preserved judicial review 
of constitutional tort claims through the vehicle of the Bivens action.‖130 
Most importantly, the Westfall Act effectively prohibits the Court from 
eviscerating the Bivens remedy. Under the Westfall Act, the only avenue 
for the pursuit of remedies for constitutional violations at the hands of 
those acting under color of federal law lies with the Bivens action.
131
 The 
 
 
the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for 
the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes 
liability upon the individual government officials involved).‖); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–20, 19 n.5 
(1980) (―[T]he congressional comments accompanying [the FTCA] amendment made it crystal clear 
that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action . . . . In the absence 
of a contrary expression from Congress, § 2680 (h) thus contemplates that victims . . . shall have an 
action under FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the individual 
officials . . . .‖). 
 125. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19–20, 19 n.5 (summarizing the congressional comments 
accompanying the FTCA amendments). 
 126. Carlos Vazquez and Stephen Vladeck argue that the Westfall Act should not be read to 
preempt state constitutional tort claims against federal officers. See Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 
13. From this, they conclude that the availability of adequate state constitutional tort claims may in 
some circumstances justify refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy because the Constitution ―is 
presumably indifferent to whether the required damage remedy is provided by federal or state law.‖ Id. 
at 576. We assume for the purpose of our argument that state law claims brought directly against 
federal officers, whatever their source, are unavailable under the Westfall Act. 
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)–(2) (2006).  
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). 
 130. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 13, at 138; see also Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 13. 
 131. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 13, at 137–38. 
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preempting of state-law torts coupled with sovereign immunity that 
prohibits Bivens suits against the United States mandates this 
conclusion.
132
 Placed against this backdrop, the Westfall Act cannot be 
read as a mere waiver of immunity for whatever manner of liability the 
Court deems fit to mandate under later Bivens jurisprudence. Rather, the 
Act‘s saving reference to Bivens ―operates less as a modest exception to 
immunity than as a congressional selection of the Bivens action as the only 
method individuals were authorized to use in pressing constitutional 
claims.‖133 Thus, prior to Minneci, Bivens jurisprudence had reached a 
stasis with the Westfall Act preserving its availability and the Court 
refusing to extend further. 
2. The Westfall Act and Minneci 
Given this understanding of the Westfall Act, all Bivens analyses 
should begin by asking whether any given remedy fits within the scope of 
the remedies that were approved by the legislature in 1988. In Minneci, 
this would have meant, prior to conducting a separate Wilkie analysis, 
determining whether the remedy sought by Mr. Pollard fit within the 
Bivens remedies that already had legislative approval. To do otherwise 
would be to disregard legislative action and undermine the central 
separation-of-powers thrust of the Bivens inquiry. Unfortunately, this is 
exactly what the Court did. Thus, in our view, the Court should have 
explicitly asked whether a Bivens claim against privately employed prison 
guards falls within Congress‘s codification of the remedy in the Westfall 
Act.
134
 As we defend in the next section, we think that such a claim does 
fall within the scope of Congress‘s approval. We turn first, however, to a 
fuller defense of asking this predicate question. 
Assuming that every new context in which a Bivens remedy is 
proposed triggers a new step-one and step-two Wilkie inquiry, the 
alternative-remedies analysis is inconsistent with prior jurisprudence and 
the Westfall Act. Let‘s take Bivens as an example. In that case, the 
plaintiff sought remedies for ―great humiliation, embarrassment, and 
mental suffering‖ as a result of an arrest and search carried out without a 
warrant or probable cause.
135
 If the Court‘s analysis in Minneci were 
 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 137. 
 134. The Court did briefly address the Westfall Act. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 
(2012) (noting that the Act bars suits against federal officers for state-law torts). 
 135. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389–
90 (1971). Although the Court also characterized additional allegations in the complaint as alleging the 
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correct, then a plaintiff seeking to apply Bivens in a case seeking damages 
for physical injuries arising from excessive force context might have to 
show that a ―new‖ Bivens remedy is appropriate pursuant to Wilkie‘s step-
one and step-two analysis. But neither lower courts nor the Supreme Court 
has ever applied Bivens in such a constrained manner.
136
 Similarly, the 
Court‘s decision in Carlson has never been thought to be limited to Eighth 
Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs, but 
instead has been applied without question to all varieties of Eighth 
Amendment claims.
137
 
This all begs the question of how to decide when a putative Bivens 
claim is presented in a context that requires renewed application of Wilkie 
steps one and two. In other words, when is a plaintiff seeking an extension 
of Bivens such that an alternative-remedies analysis is required and when 
is a plaintiff seeking solely to apply a previously accepted Bivens cause of 
action such that an alternative-remedies analysis would be inappropriate? 
This is an important question for courts at all levels, but the Supreme 
Court has yet to provide a clear framework for answering this question. 
In our view, the best way to approach the question is from the 
separation-of-powers perspective that drives the rest of the Bivens 
analysis. It asks whether the new context in which the claim arises—
perhaps it is a new category of defendant, plaintiff, or a different theory of 
recovery—alters the prior separation of powers analysis in which a Bivens 
remedy was inferred and later codified. In other words, is there any reason 
 
 
use of ―unreasonable force,‖ id. at 389, the plaintiff apparently only referred to the ―forcibl[e]‖ use of 
handcuffs while making the arrest, see Br. for Pet‘r at 2, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also James 
E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in 
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 2009).  
 136. For instance, the Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently assumed without analysis 
that the Bivens remedy applies to Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194 (2001), overruled on other grounds Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989) (in dicta, assuming that Bivens applies to excessive 
force claims); Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2011) (reviewing Bivens claim for 
excessive force); Thomas v. Durastini, 607 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); Tekle v. United States, 
511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting qualified immunity in Bivens excessive force claim); Ting v. 
United States, 927 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (in dicta, treating excessive force claims as a ―classic Bivens-style tort‖); King v. United 
States, 576 F.2d 432, 439 (2d Cir. 1978) (in dicta assuming that a Bivens action would lie for excessive 
force). 
 137. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994) (applying Bivens to failure to protect 
claim by prisoner); Lineberry v. United States, 436 Fed. App‘x. 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding 
insufficient facts alleged to state Bivens claim for overcrowding); Jones v. Simek, 193 F.3d 485 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (reviewing Bivens Eighth Amendment excessive force claim); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 
795 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding summary judgment inappropriate in Eighth Amendment excessive force 
claim). 
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to think that Congress would want the Court to treat this defendant, or this 
plaintiff, or this theory of recovery, differently, given the existence of the 
already-established Bivens action? 
It cannot be that the answer to this question will always be ―yes.‖ That 
would imply that every new application of an established Bivens action 
would require an alternative remedy and special factors analysis. And it 
would undermine the congressional decision to recognize Bivens actions in 
the Westfall Act. Nor would it make sense to rely on something like the 
―clearly established‖ law inquiry from qualified immunity—that doctrine 
focuses on the notice to an individual defendant,
138
 and not the structural 
limitations on the power of the coordinate branches of the federal 
government. 
The consequence of this focus on separation of powers is that generally 
the identity of the defendant—assumed to be indicative of a new context 
in Minneci—is irrelevant to whether a Bivens remedy is appropriate. In 
Bivens, then, the Court‘s focus was on the distinction between private 
citizens and an ―agent‖ acting ―in the name of the United States‖; the right 
to be free of unconstitutional conduct ―carried out by virtue of federal 
authority‖; the invasion of ―federally protected rights,‖ and so on.139 To 
that end, the Court relied on precedent that treated non-federal employees 
acting pursuant to federal authority identically to federally employed 
agents.
140
 Thus, the Court recognized that such violations could be 
perpetrated by all individuals acting under color of federal law, whether 
directly employed by or simply acting at the behest of the federal 
government. 
Since Bivens, the Court has never held that it must undergo a renewed 
Bivens inquiry every time a new category of defendant is implicated in a 
case. Instead, the Court has focused on whether the identity of the 
defendant alters the separation-of-powers considerations that inform the 
Bivens doctrine. Take the Court‘s decisions in Chappell and Stanley, both 
of which involved challenges by members of the military. In Chappell v. 
Wallace, the Court declined to provide a Bivens-type remedy for a service-
member against his superior officers, because of the constitutional 
commitment to Congress to regulate military affairs.
141
 United States v. 
 
 
 138. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 36 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 
 139. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391–92. 
 140. See id. at 392–94 (citing Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) and Byars v. United 
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), cases in which state officials acted under color of federal law in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
 141. 462 U.S. 296, 300–01, 304 (1983). 
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Stanley was distinguishable from Chappell because it involved defendants 
not within the military chain of command and, similar to Minneci, not 
even directly employed by the United States.
142
 Despite the plaintiff‘s 
attempts to distinguish the cases on this ground, the Court did not rest its 
extension analysis on the difference between the defendants in Chappell 
and Stanley, but instead considered the separation-of-powers implications 
to be the same in both cases.
143
 Indeed, the Court made clear that what 
mattered for the extension analysis in both cases was the ―degree of 
disruption‖ of military decisionmaking that a particular rule would 
impose, a consideration that is rooted almost entirely in separation-of-
powers doctrine—not defendant identity.144 
The Court‘s decision in FDIC v. Meyer145 is to the same effect. In 
Meyer, the plaintiff sought to apply Bivens liability to federal agencies 
rather than individual officers. The Court relied on the extension analysis 
to decline the invitation, but not because of an interpretive rule triggered 
by this new category of defendant per se. Instead, the Court noted that 
applying Bivens to federal agencies in particular would raise significant 
separation-of-powers concerns because of the burden it would place on the 
federal fisc.
146
  
In sum, the Minneci Court, contrary to past practice, failed to ask 
whether finding a Bivens remedy for Mr. Pollard constituted an extension 
at all. Rather, it asserted that the existence of alternative state-law 
remedies illustrated that Bivens was inapt here. Such a change in 
doctrine—one eliding this predicate scope question with the alternative-
remedies question—would be momentous on its own. But given that 
Congress codified Bivens in the Westfall Act, the failure to address this 
first-order inquiry is a blatant disregard for the intent of Congress. 
B. Congressional Intent and Exacerbating Remedial Asymmetries 
We turn now to answering the question that the Minneci Court ignored: 
does the finding of a Bivens remedy as against privately employed prison 
guards acting under color of federal law constitute an extension of Bivens? 
If one considers this question implicit in Minneci through the lens of 
 
 
 142. 483 U.S. 669, 674 n.2 (1987) (noting that defendants included physicians, the Board of 
Regents of the University of Maryland, and unknown federal agents). 
 143. Id. at 679–82. 
 144. Id. at 682–83 (choosing a test that ―provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be 
discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters‖). 
 145. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 146. Id. at 486 (citing United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)). 
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separation-of-powers, as we suggest, there seems to be no compelling 
reason to depart from Carlson‘s liability rule. We rest this conclusion 
upon two arguments. First, the Court should construe Bivens remedies in 
parallel with § 1983 remedies. And second, absent explicit congressional 
statements to the contrary, Bivens remedies as against private and public 
employees acting under color of federal law should be symmetrical.  
1. Bivens and Section 1983 Parallelism 
Under the Westfall Act, Bivens, at least as it stood in 1988, stands on 
near equal footing with § 1983 actions, the statutory cause of action 
provided to remedy constitutional violations committed under color of 
state law.
147
 That is to say, both remedies have the full, statutory backing 
of Congress. As Pfander and Baltmanis aptly put it, after ―Congress . . . 
confirmed the Bivens action in the Westfall Act, distinctions between the 
right to sue state and federal officials seem . . . untenable.‖148 The Court, 
moreover, often treats Bivens and § 1983 doctrine as parallel.
149
 Absent a 
strong showing to the contrary, then, congressional intent weighs heavily 
towards construing the scope of the Bivens remedy in parallel with § 1983. 
Minneci, however, creates a large remedial asymmetry between Bivens 
and § 1983.  
Victims of unconstitutional conduct caused by persons acting under 
color of state law, be they privately or publicly employed, may seek a 
remedy via § 1983. Although § 1983 actions were initially brought against 
state or municipal employees acting under color of state law,
150
 they also 
may be maintained against private contractors whose conduct can fairly be 
attributed to the State. Thus, in 1988—the same year that the Westfall Act 
was passed—the Court in West v. Atkins held that privately employed 
doctors who provide services to State prisoners may be held liable under 
§ 1983
151
 for violations of the Eighth Amendment.  
 
 
 147. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 13, at 139–41. 
 148. Id. at 139. 
 149. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) (holding that the elements of 
malicious prosecution, Bivens claims are the ―federal analog to suits brought against state officials‖ 
under § 1983); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (stating that in claims under § 1983 and 
Bivens the ―qualified immunity analysis is identical‖). 
 150. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. 
New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that state officials act ―under color 
of law‖ for Section 1983 purposes even when those officials are acting contrary to state or municipal 
law). 
 151. 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
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The logic of holding private individuals to constitutional standards of 
behavior when their actions are clothed with state authority is based in part 
on the Supreme Court‘s concern in West that the alternative would leave 
states free to limit constitutional scrutiny by contracting out their public 
responsibilities.
152
 In the absence of a theory that linked private actors to 
the State when their conduct is fairly attributable to the State, the 
possibility exists that § 1983, the principal means of enforcing 
constitutional rights, would fade into obscurity with greater public-private 
partnership in the delivery of public services.
153
 The Court later re-
affirmed this basic premise in the context of a § 1983 suit against private 
prison guards,
154
 and the lower courts have applied this notion to myriad 
other private individuals who take on state responsibilities or who 
otherwise act pursuant to state authority.
155
  
Minneci‘s impact on Bivens likely will have the exact result on 
regulation of federal actors that the Court feared for § 1983 litigation in 
West. In Minneci, it was assumed that the individual defendants had acted 
under color of federal law.
156
 Yet the Court rejected liability under Bivens 
for these same actors. Nor could Mr. Minneci sue the federal agency that 
 
 
 152. Id. at 56 n.14. 
 153. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 725 (2010) 
(providing examples of public-private partnerships); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on 
Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 417–21 (2006) (describing trends in 
privatization); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1377–94 
(2003) (providing examples of privatization). 
 154. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (assuming § 1983 liability for the purposes of 
determining whether privately employed prison guards have a qualified immunity defense); see also 
Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that employees of 
private prison-management company may be sued under § 1983 because confinement of 
wrongdoers—though sometimes delegated to private entities—is a fundamentally governmental 
function); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that employees of 
private prison-management company were acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes in that 
they were performing a ―traditional state function‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ancata v. 
Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that employees of a private medical 
service responsible for treating state prisoners engaged in state action subjecting it to suit under § 1983 
because it performed ―a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state‖); see also 
Robin Miller, Annotation, Rights of Prisoners in Private Prisons, 119 A.L.R. 5th 1, 28–29 (2004). 
 155. Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
private physicians sitting on county hospital‘s credentialing committee were state actors); Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 
2007) (private provider of rehabilitation services to released prisoners was state actor for First 
Amendment purposes); Romanski v. Detroit Entm‘t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(private security officer at casino state actor in Fourth Amendment challenge); Payton v. Rush-
Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 627–30 (7th Cir. 1999) (private police officers given power to make 
arrests may be state actors); cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (ban on 
use of race in peremptory strikes applied to private civil litigant); Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 
501 (1946) (company town considered arm of state for First Amendment challenge). 
 156. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 627 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting). 
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contracted with the Minneci defendants.
157
 In the absence of any federal 
employee who could be said to have been personally involved in Mr. 
Minneci‘s mistreatment, there appears to be no means of enforcing federal 
constitutional norms
158
 against actors clothed with federal authority. Thus 
under Minneci, as the Court suggested in West, the federal government 
may choose to contract out their public obligations, thereby eliminating 
any Bivens cause of action for unconstitutional conduct by federal actors. 
Such a result is prohibited under § 1983 and because the Westfall Act 
cements a parallelism to § 1983 practice, such a result should have been 
avoided under Bivens doctrine. 
2. Symmetrical Bivens Relief in the Public-Private Context 
In a similar manner, the Minneci opinion improperly widens 
asymmetries between public and private employees who commit 
constitutional violations while acting under color of federal law. In 
Malesko, one reason the Court offered for not imposing Bivens liability 
upon the corporate private prison was that prisoners held in federally run 
prisons lacked a remedy against the Bureau of Prisons.
159
 The Court 
offered a separation-of-powers-based defense of this view, stating that 
―[w]hether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability costs on 
private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to 
decide.‖160 Interestingly, this symmetrical-liability principle played no part 
in the Minneci opinion. The Court simply never mentions this aspect of 
Malesko, despite relying on Malesko to justify the use of state law as an 
alternative remedy. 
If the Court would have followed Malesko‘s symmetrical-liability 
principle, it would have found that a Bivens claim lies in Minneci. The 
only factual deviation between Minneci and Carlson is the happenstance 
that the United States government incarcerated the Minneci plaintiff in a 
facility that is privately run pursuant to a contract with the federal 
government rather than a facility run directly by the federal government. 
 
 
 157. Cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 158. State tort law might provide damages, but it will not enforce the constitutional norm. See 
Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1109–11 (10th Cir. 2005), rev’d evenly divided en 
banc, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006) (Ebel, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that state-law torts are not, 
under Supreme Court law, fungible with remedies designed to remedy constitutional violations). And 
state law does not reach all areas regulated by federal constitutional norms. See infra notes 173–79. 
 159. As we note above, there is some question whether this is a holding or dicta. See supra note 
84 and accompanying text. 
 160. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 354 U.S. 61, 72 (2001). 
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As the Court held in West, it would be perverse to condition the ability to 
protect constitutional rights on the assignment of a federal prisoner to one 
facility or another.
161
 The symmetrical-liability principle, coupled with 
Carlson, calls for Bivens liability in a situation like Minneci. 
The Westfall Act‘s ratification of Bivens actions against federal 
employees, moreover, cannot be construed to create asymmetrical public-
private liability. To the extent that congressional inaction has posed a 
separation-of-powers barrier to implying Bivens remedies in past cases, the 
Court had limited such a barrier to those circumstances in which the 
inaction ―has not been inadvertent‖ and suggested that Congress ―has 
provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for 
constitutional violations,‖ thus meriting judicial deference.162 Given this 
interpretative canon, the language in the Westfall Act strongly supports the 
view that a Bivens action should be generally available to those injured by 
persons acting under color of federal law.
163
 As such, the plaintiff‘s claim 
in Minneci, like Carlson, had a strong claim to congressional approval.  
III. LIMITING MINNECI‘S IMPACT 
Because of these three concerns, it is worth taking some time to 
examine the potential limitations on Minneci‘s reach. In so doing, we seek 
to call upon insights that are practical, doctrinal, and theoretical. We first 
identify some of the ways that advocates might use state and federal law to 
ensure, perhaps indirectly, that constitutional norms are followed. Then we 
turn to some doctrinal and theoretical considerations that could be brought 
to bear in limiting Minneci‘s impact on the enforcement of constitutional 
rights. We include in these the separation-of-powers framework that we 
argue for here as a natural guide for application of Bivens doctrine. 
 
 
 161. 487 U.S. at 56. The Court, however, has once found public versus private employment a 
matter of concern in inmate constitutional rights litigation. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 
(1997) (assuming § 1983 liability for the purposes of determining that privately employed prison 
guards do not have a qualified immunity defense). Importantly, Richardson speaks to the availability 
of a defense for the guards, not the constitutional rights of the defendant inmates. That is to say, even 
in Richardson the rights of inmates are not modified by the employment status of the guards. 
 162. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988); id. at 425–26 (detailing history of 
congressional consideration of remedies for delays in receipt of government benefits); id. at 429 
(―Whether or not we believe that its response was the best response, Congress is the body charged with 
making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits 
program.‖). 
 163. See, e.g., Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 13, at 122 (noting that Congress preserved the 
Bivens action in § 2679(b)(2)(A) and arguing that ―the Westfall Act supports . . . the routine 
availability of Bivens claims‖). 
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First, advocates might increasingly turn to state law, in at least two 
ways. For instance, a return to the converse § 1983 action proposed some 
time ago by Akhil Amar may now be more appealing.
164
 Twenty-five 
years ago, Amar proposed that states provide a cause of action for 
violations of the federal constitution by federal officials, be it through 
constitutional amendment, statutory enactment, or judge-made common 
law.
165
 As Amar has since recognized, no State has passed a converse 
§ 1983 action, either through constitutional amendment or statutory 
enactment.
166
 But the possibility exists that such a cause of action might 
exist or be created through common law.
167
 
However, even were such a cause of action to exist at state law, one 
might wonder how it could be enforced against private contractors with 
the federal government. One possibility is that such laws could be applied 
against private individuals when they act under color of federal law, on the 
same theory that traditional § 1983 actions are applied against private 
contractors. Another possibility is that actions for negligent hiring, 
supervision, or retention could be used to interpose federal constitutional 
norms via state tort law.
168
 
In each of these proposed work-arounds of Minneci, a cause of action 
would be brought against a private entity or individual. But it might also 
be possible, even after Minneci, to bring either Bivens claims or FTCA 
claims against the government employee or agency that contracts with the 
private individual or entity. It is well established that private corporations 
and employees are not covered by the FTCA, even when they are doing 
the work of the federal government.
169
 But the federal agencies and 
 
 
 164. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions and Answers 
about Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1993) [hereinafter Amar, Using State Law]. John 
Preis has assessed this approach in a recent article, but he is skeptical of its effectiveness. See 
generally John F. Preis, The False Promise of the Converse-1983 Action, 87 IND. L.J. 1697, 1709–26 
(2012). 
 165. See Amar, Using State Law, supra note 164, at 161. 
 166. Id. at 160. 
 167. For instance, state trespass law has vindicated rights analogous to the Fourth Amendment for 
hundreds of years. See id. 
 168. Some courts have found that a state law claim for negligent supervision, training, hiring, or 
retention may be brought where the negligence caused a constitutional violation, although to our 
knowledge none have done so where the defendant was a private actor. See, e.g., Prince George‘s 
Cnty. v. Longtin, 19 A.3d 859, 886 (Md. 2011); McDermitt v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 814 P.2d 115, 115–
16 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that state law immunity is unavailable where negligent training or 
supervision caused a constitutional violation); Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1144 (N.Y. 1996) 
(recognizing cause of action for negligent training and supervision that causes constitutional violation). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 2671; B & A Marine Co. v. Am. Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
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employees who agree to contracts that provide insufficient protections 
from misconduct by the contracting entity may be amenable to suit 
through the FTCA or Bivens. Under the FTCA, claimants may argue that, 
based on negligence in monitoring the private bodies which take on public 
functions, a public employee has violated state law. There is reason to 
think that such negligence should be actionable when it causes a 
constitutional violation given that state constitutional claims often 
incorporate federal constitutional law as the standard of care.
170
 More 
directly, a federal employee who contracts with a private entity without 
taking adequate measures to ensure that the private contractor adheres to 
constitutional standards may also be held accountable under a Bivens 
theory if they have acted with sufficient culpability.
171
 
Aside from these practical suggestions, Minneci also may be subject to 
limitations along the lines proposed in this Essay. First, recall that Minneci 
never explicitly proposed a structure for deciding the predicate question of 
whether a Bivens plaintiff seeks to ―extend‖ existing Bivens doctrine or 
only seeks to enforce an existing Bivens remedy. Even after Minneci, then, 
it may be fair game to argue that a particular application of Bivens doctrine 
to private individuals is not an extension of the cause of action—using 
separation-of-powers analysis—and hence not subject to the Wilkie two-
step creation analysis. 
Second, even if Minneci signals the increased importance of state law 
to a Bivens analysis, it should not be read to prohibit all Bivens actions 
 
 
 170. See, e.g., Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 245–48 (Ala. 2000) (holding state law torts of 
assault, unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy barred as a matter of law because the 
police officer met the Fourth Amendment‘s probable cause standard when detaining the plaintiff); 
Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278–79 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the 
plaintiff‘s state law claims of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false 
imprisonment failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff ―did not meet his burden of producing 
evidence showing [the defendants] used physical force against or exerted authority over him that 
resulted in a ‗seizure‘ under the Fourth Amendment‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Renk v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (noting that a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment must 
show that a defendant‘s actions were unlawful, which often amounts to whether a defendant acting 
under color of law had probable cause). 
 171. Indeed, courts have acknowledged the existence of such a remedy even after Minneci. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Neveleff, No. 11 Civ. 907 2013 WL 489442, *8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2013) (recognizing 
Bivens claim against federal officials who were responsible for arranging and monitoring contract with 
private prison corporation whose employees abused immigration detainees). The underlying theory of 
such actions is that a federal official who is deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm facing federal 
prisoners or detainees has violated the Eighth Amendment, whether the risk of harm is created by 
another federal employee, a prisoner or detainee, or a private contractor whose performance is 
monitored by the federal official. See id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) 
(recognizing Bivens claim for prison officials‘ deliberate indifference to the risk of harm posed by 
other prisoners). 
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against private contractors with the federal government. The Supreme 
Court has recognized three distinct areas in which Bivens remedies should 
be enforced: Fourth Amendment violations,
172
 employment 
discrimination,
173
 and Eighth Amendment violations.
174
 Minneci leaves 
undisturbed that aspect of Bivens which found a tension between the 
interests protected by state law torts and those protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.
175
 Presumably, then, private contractors with the federal 
government who are sued under Bivens for Fourth Amendment violations 
would not be able to make the same claims regarding alternative state law 
remedies that convinced the Court in Minneci. In other words, Fourth 
Amendment violations are not the ―kind of conduct that typically falls 
within the scope of traditional state tort law.‖176 This may even be true in 
the private prison context, where some limited Fourth Amendment rights 
survive incarceration.
177
 
A similar argument could be made about the unconstitutional 
discrimination that Davis found actionable against federal actors.
178
 Thus, 
private contractors who act under color of law to discriminate in ways that 
would violate equal protection principles
179
 may be held accountable on a 
Bivens theory. State tort law, after all, does not provide comparable 
protections against discriminatory conduct. And although federal law 
provides protections against discrimination in some contexts—
employment, contractual relations—it does not encompass all kinds of 
discrimination that could be engaged in by others. Indeed, to the extent 
that the Supreme Court has come to identify the harm in equal protection 
cases to be the fact of classification itself and not necessarily the 
consequences, it may be that neither state nor federal law provides a 
similar remedy against private actors.
180
 For instance, if a private prison 
engages in discrimination by, say, segregating prison housing, it is not 
 
 
 172. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 173. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 174. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 175. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621–22 (2012). 
 176. Id. at 623. 
 177. Prisoners retain privacy rights in bodily integrity, for instance. See Sanchez v. Pereira-
Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 42 n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). 
 178. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 179. Although Davis was brought pursuant to the Fifth Amendment‘s due process clause, the 
equal protection principles specifically guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment have been held 
applicable to the Federal Government through the Fifth. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 180. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007); id. 
at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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obvious that any federal law would provide a cause of action to an injured 
plaintiff.
181
 
Finally, even within the context of Eighth Amendment claims, Minneci 
leaves some room for litigants and courts to distinguish failure to provide 
medical care cases and failure to protect cases.
182
 Although the Court 
acknowledged this limitation grudgingly,
183
 it is an opening for future 
cases. And if litigants and courts focus more squarely on the separation-of-
powers dimensions that have governed Bivens creation-and-extension 
analysis since its inception, then the doctrine will maintain some 
coherence. 
One also may limit Minneci‘s reach by focusing on the separation-of-
powers analysis identified here. If we return to the three areas of 
constitutional jurisprudence in which Bivens actions have already been 
recognized—Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection (through the Due 
Process Clause), and the Eighth Amendment—it is evident that the rights 
that flow from each of these areas of jurisprudence have different 
implications for separation of powers. Although like the rest of the Bill of 
Rights, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments each act formally as a 
limitation on the power of the federal government, the Eighth Amendment 
right litigated in Minneci is more complex. Mr. Pollard sought relief for 
the failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care, a rare 
affirmative obligation imposed by the Constitution as a corollary to the 
State‘s use of its power to incarcerate.184 As the Court explained in Estelle, 
a prisoner has no choice but to rely on the prison administration for 
medical treatment. If the Government did not have a constitutional 
obligation to provide treatment, a prisoner would suffer unnecessary pain 
and suffering, or even death.
185
 A similar logic justified the Court in 
finding an Eighth Amendment right to be protected from harm while in 
prison, imposing upon prison administrators an affirmative duty to protect 
prisoners because incarceration leaves prisoners without the traditional 
 
 
 181. By contrast, such segregation by federal officials would trigger strict scrutiny and likely 
would be invalidated. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny 
to California‘s policy of segregating prisoners by race). 
 182. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012). 
 183. Id. at 625–26 (noting that while Pollard ―does not convincingly show that there are such 
cases,‖ the Court would ―concede that we cannot prove a negative or be totally certain that the features 
of state tort law relevant here will universally prove to be, or remain, as we have described them.‖).  
 184. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 185. Id. at 103. 
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means of self-defense.
186
 But affirmative obligations are rare, and the 
federal judiciary operates at the furthest extent of its authority when it 
imposes affirmative obligations.
187
 
Thus, for separation-of-powers reasons, the Court‘s authority in an 
Eighth Amendment case such as Minneci may already be at its weakest, 
making the invocation of a remedy that much more difficult to justify. 
This may be particularly true where the need to vindicate the affirmative 
obligation of the Government is rendered less essential by the presence of 
alternative forms of action that more or less accomplish the same goal. 
From a separation-of-powers perspective, however, Equal Protection and 
Fourth Amendment principles may stand on different footing. When a 
court enforces these negative protections, it is acting at the height of its 
constitutional authority. The reason for enforcing these rights is not that 
the government has taken upon itself a particular obligation with respect to 
the claimant, but that the Constitution expresses the worry that the 
government cannot be trusted to behave fairly or reasonably towards the 
claimant. Rather than mediating between institutional penological needs 
and the obligations that arise from imprisonment—as in the Eighth 
Amendment context—the Court enforcing equal protection and Fourth 
Amendment principles can more comfortably claim to be directly 
enforcing constitutional norms. And the concern that the Executive may 
seek to contract away the negative limitations imposed by the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments may be more pressing than in the Eighth Amendment 
context. 
Finally, limitations on the scope of Minneci may also arise, ironically, 
from the federal common law government contractor doctrine, which in 
some circumstances immunizes contractors with the federal government 
from state law liability.
188
 Minneci, Malesko and other lower court 
 
 
 186. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (―[H]aving stripped them of virtually every 
means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are 
not free to let the state of nature take its course.‖). 
 187. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 53 (2010) (―It is primarily for institutional reasons that the Supreme Court 
has declined to announce or enforce affirmative obligations and has focused on enforcing limits and 
negative rights.‖); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 
2327–30 (1990) (reviewing and criticizing judicial hesitancy to enforce affirmative obligations); see 
also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (―To translate the limitation on governmental power 
implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to 
subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman . . . . Whether freedom of choice that 
is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not a 
matter of constitutional entitlement.‖). 
 188. For general discussions of the government contractor doctrine, see Kenneth G. English, Note, 
Government Complicity and a Government Contractor’s Liability in Qui Tam and Tort Cases, 33 PUB. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1510 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1473 
 
 
 
 
decisions have failed to contemplate this issue fully.
189
 The leading 
government contractor doctrine case is Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp.,
190
 where the Supreme Court held that federal common law 
preempts state-law tort actions against independent contractors who 
manufacture munitions for the federal government. In Boyle, a copilot of a 
Marine Sikorsky helicopter drowned following its crash into the Atlantic. 
His estate brought a successful state law tort claim against Sikorsky, 
contending that the outward-opening escape hatch was ineffective in an 
underwater crash and that its handle was obstructed by other equipment.
191
 
The Court overturned the jury verdict on the grounds that the government 
contractor defense, as a matter of federal common law, preempted the state 
law claim.
192
  
The Court reasoned that state law is preempted by federal common law 
where there is a uniquely federal interest and there is a significant conflict 
between federal policy and the operation of state law.
193
 The Court found 
these criteria met in Boyle, striking separation-of-powers chords familiar 
to a student of the Court‘s Bivens canon. Raising concerns about the 
federal fisc, the court noted that without government-contractor immunity 
―the contractor will [either] decline to manufacture the design specified by 
the government, or it will raise its price.‖194 Next, raising unique 
competency concerns, the Court reasoned that the threat of state law 
liability would interfere with the Government‘s legitimate balancing of 
 
 
CONT. L.J. 649, 657–59 (2004) (critiquing government contractor doctrine as economically 
inefficient); Matthew G. Mazefsky, Note, Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko: Unmasking 
the Implied Damage Remedy, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 639, 659–61 (2003) (discussing the government 
contractor doctrine as it is addressed in Malesko); Sean Watts, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp. and the Government Contractor Defense: An Analysis Based on the Current Circuit Split 
Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 687 (1999) (arguing for Congressional 
action to resolve doctrinal confusion in this area); Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: 
Should Government Contractors Share the Sovereign’s Immunities From Exemplary Damages?, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1997) (critiquing the extension of immunities government immunities to 
institutions such as private prisons under the government contractor doctrine); Ronald A. Cass & 
Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 
VA. L. REV. 257 (1991) (providing an economic analysis of the government contractor doctrine); A.L. 
Haizlip, The Government Contractor Defense in Tort Liability: A Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 116 (1989). 
 189. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 (2001) (acknowledging defense but 
finding nothing in record to support it); Peoples v. CCA Detentions Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1108 n.13 
(10th Cir. 2005) (without specifying reasons, finding that record did not support government 
contractor immunity). The Minneci Court failed to discuss the government contractor doctrine at all. 
 190. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 191. Id. at 503. 
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 193. Id. at 50708. 
 194. Id. at 507. 
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safety features against military efficacy in designing war material.
195
 The 
Court then fashioned a three-prong test to determine when a defendant has 
successfully asserted a defense under the government contractor doctrine. 
To wit, state-law liability for design defects in military equipment is 
preempted by federal common law when: ―(1) the United States approved 
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those 
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the 
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but 
not to the United States.‖196 
The lower federal courts have since split on the scope of the federal 
contractor doctrine outside of the military supplier context.
197
 A minority 
of courts refuse to apply the doctrine outside of military procurement 
cases.
198
 A majority of courts, however, apply the government contractor 
doctrine in any scenario that satisfies the Boyle three-part test.
199
 
Moreover, privately run federal prisons have attempted to use the 
government contractor doctrine as a bar to prisoner plaintiffs‘ state law 
claims.
200
  
If a court were to find that the government contractor doctrine applies 
to claims brought against privately run federal prisons, however, the 
assumption driving the holding in Minneci—that state law provides an 
alternative remedy—would no longer obtain. But if so, two potential 
avenues of relief would open up. First, a Bivens claim against the private 
 
 
 195. Id. at 511. 
 196. Id. at 512. 
 197. See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, The Government Contractor Defense: When Do 
Governmental Interests Justify Excusing A Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Products?, 28 
SETON HALL L. REV. 430, 432–33 (1998). 
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 199. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Brown v. 
Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 588–89 (5th Cir. 1999) (extending the doctrine to protect persons 
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Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying the doctrine in ―civilian 
relationships‖ where ―a contractor has acted in the sovereign‘s stead and can prove the elements of the 
defense‖ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 200. See, e.g., Adorno v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Adorno, the 
plaintiffs brought state law claims against a privately run federal prison alleging sexual misconduct by 
the prison‘s guards. Id. at 508–11. The defendant argued that it was entitled to the government 
contractor defense because it hired, supervised and trained employees in conformity with policies that 
had been specifically approved by the BOP. Id. at 521. Although the district court rejected the 
application of Boyle to the case, it assumed that it applied outside the military supplier context. Id. at 
52022. Other district courts have applied nearly the same reasoning. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 
F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting government contractor doctrine in suit by Iraqi nationals held 
in privately run federal prison in Iraq); Scainetti v. United States ex rel. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 01 
Civ. 9970, 2002 WL 31844920, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2002) (unpublished); Norwood v. Esmor, 
Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8281, 1997 WL 65913, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997). 
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contractors may become viable—just as in Bivens itself, the plaintiff 
would otherwise be denied any remedy whatsoever.
201
 Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, because a requirement of the federal contractor 
defense is that the private conduct be directed by the federal government, a 
Bivens remedy would presumably be available against the federal officials 
who directed the contractor to engage in the allegedly unconstitutional act. 
As the Tenth Circuit has made clear in other contexts, ―[t]he government 
contractor defense . . . [only applies] when the [contractor] has conformed 
to reasonably precise specifications established or approved by the 
government.‖202 The Second Circuit has suggested this same principle 
applies in the privately run prison cases as well. ―The government 
contractor defense only shields a [privately run federal prison] from claims 
arising out of its actions where the government has exercised its discretion 
and judgment in approving precise specifications to which the contractor 
must adhere.‖203 Given that the government contractor defense is 
essentially a claim that ―[t]he Government made me do it,‖204 the 
successful invocation of this defense by private contractors may provide 
an avenue for relief out from under Minneci‘s holding.  
CONCLUSION 
The Minneci Court‘s novel federalism turn to inform the Bivens 
analysis imposes a structure that bears no logical relation to the separation-
of-powers question at the heart of the Bivens dilemma. If the Court‘s 
reasoning is extended it will rapidly extinguish whatever coherence that 
has been found in the doctrine. The decision lacks foundation in doctrine, 
thwarts congressional intent, and fails to provide a coherent structure to 
resolve subsequent Bivens inquiries. Along the way it confuses the 
question of whether an extension of Bivens is needed with the question of 
whether an extension is warranted, breaks with the presumption of parallel 
doctrine with section 1983 cases and rejects the Malesko Court‘s 
symmetrical public-private liability principle. 
But Minneci need not be another in a line of cases that mark the 
eventual demise of Bivens doctrine. Its practical impact can be limited by 
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recourse to state law. Its doctrinal foundations can be undermined by the 
critical appraisal that we provide here and that others are sure to contribute 
to. And its reasoning can be confined by the very separation-of-powers 
principles that we contend run throughout Bivens jurisprudence. 
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